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and Randall Mark for assistance andhelpful suggestions.Considerable attention has been devoted in the economic literature to
capital accumulation and savings. Little systematic attention, however, has
been given to the actual process of saving, by which is meant the generation
of nonwage income through the productive management of accumulated stocks of
nonhuman assets. Such activity generally has been thought of as a "neutral"
process which does not claim the use of scarce resources. At least, the re-
turns from saving activity have been considered independent of the amount of
resources foregone in its pursuit. The central thesis of this paper is that
the management of portfolios incorporating a variety of investment assets does
require the use of time and other scarce resources in searching for, collecting,
interpreting, and applying relevant information. Accordingly, the returns on
these assets would depend, in part, on managerial efforts and abilities and
other related inputs.
The view that the generation of nonwage returns by individuals is a
neutral process may be rooted in Irving Fisher's theory of interest which large-
ly abstracted from differences in rates of interest at a point in time in order
to focus attention on the determinants of an overall, unique market rate of
interest. It has been indirectly defended in the contemporary economic litera-
ture as an implication of so-called "efficient" capital markets. In an ideal
or efficient market, is is argued, all the relevant information concerning
the productivity of assets is fully impounded in the market prices of these
assets at any given point in time.1 No gains are to be had by individual in-
vestors from search or from other management efforts in such a market. Speci-
fically, expected nonage income may vary across assets as a function of the
"risk" indigenous to these assets but otherwise is expected to be strictly
proportional to the amountofcapital invested.2
The condition that prices of all capital assets fully reflect all
availableinformation at every point in time could befulfilled only if
information were freely available or perfectly forecast by all investors
and if all capital markets were free of transaction costs. Since none of
these conditions literally are fulfilled in practice, search and management
of portfolios could be considered unproductive to individual investors
only if all had equally ready access to relevant information andthesame
opportunities to implement it. Because relevant information concerning
the productivity of assets is costly to obtain and transaction costs slow
the process of price adjustment, investors who can collect and apply new
information at relatively low cost or stand to gain more through such
activity would be willing to sacrifice sufficient resources to secure
added returns. This hypothesis, though inconsistent with the notion that
capital markets are "perfect," is not inconsistent with the notion that they
are "efficient" in the sense of providing competitive rewards for superior
ability and resource expenditures in the management of assets.
Although, in principle, the productive saving hypothesis applies to all
capital markets, practically, its importance may vary widely across different
markets. In the centralized markets for common stocks and other highly sub-
stitutable securities, the speed of price adjustments to newly available infor-
mation may be much faster than in markets for real estate assets and unincor-
porated businesses, although even in the stock market adjustments are not in-
stantaneous.2 Furthermore, investors who secure superior information concerning
the prospects of specific securities would have an incentive to appropriate its
full value by selling it to others. The opportunities for selling superior
information presumably are constra±ned, however, by added search andtrans-
action costs to both seller and buyers. In addition, selling the information3
toall investors simultaneously ou1dprecludedifferential returns to any one
investor. Thus, one cannot rule out a priori differential returns to better-
informed investors--especially those specializing in the collection of infor-
instion--even in the markets for securities. Moreover, returns for superior
management of capital assets maybemore sizable in connection with the
management of equity in unincorporatedbusinesses (including farms),real
estateoperations, mortgage assets, and other loans. Markets for such assets
are more segmented as the assets themselves are more differentiated, less
divisible, and relatively costly to trade. Conceivably, then, the speed of
adjustment of stock and rental values to changes in market conditions is rela-
tively slow for these ty-pes of assets, and, consequently, the opportunities
for gains from search and management efforts may be more abundant.3 In con-
trast, in the markets for short—term government notes and other "safe" assets,
where yields are relatively fixed or highly predictable, returns to management
effortsmaybe low.
Whethersaving activity pays oris important in explainingsaving be-
havior ultimatelyis an empirical issue. Tests of the efficient markets hypo-
thesisin its strong form, namelythatno distinct investor or groups of in-
vestors have superior information andachievedifferential returns, to our
knowledge,have been conducted exclusively in connectionwith the markets for
securities.Even there a number of tests yielded results clearly at odds with
thathy-pothesis. Itmay also be argued that the development and rapid growth
of such occupations as portfolio managers and investment specialists is not
inconsistent with the notion that opportunities for gains from productive
management of assets do exist in practice.While the productive saving
hypothesis has potential implicatjosconcerning the relative magnitude
of returns fr search i,n
specific capital markets, our main interest is
to derive a more general set of
testable implications relating to theproductive management of assets. These implications concern a.U.ocations
of consumptive and productive resources throughout the life cycle and
saving behavior in general.
The productive saving hypothesis extends a line of thought offered by
Alfred Marshall in connection with his distinction between "gross" and. "net"
interest on capital. Whilerecognizing that gross interest typically includes
someinsurance againstrisk, Marshall also stressed that it includes "earnings
ofmanagement ofa troublesome business" and. that in some cases it may consist
almost entirely of "earnings of a kind of work for which few capitalists have
a taste."7 ButwhereasMarshall ascribed the willingness to engage in the kind
of work underlying the management of certain assets basically to peculiar in-
dividual preferences, we propose that an investor's willingness to devote re-
sources to the management of capital assets is negatively related to his manage-
inent costs and. positively related to his expected gains determined, in part,
by hisspecific training and.experience. Details of these assumptions, alDng
withsomeconventional assumptions concerning the utility of lifetime consump-
tion and. bequest, form the basis for the development of a life cycle model of
consumption, work, and. savingactivity.
Tosimplify matters, the life cycle model developed abstracts from an
explicit analysis of the joint accumulation of humanandphysical capital by
treatinghuman capitalendowments as exogenously determined. It also abstracts
fromany analysis of nonneutral attitudes toward risk andfromvariations in
thedemand for leisure in thecontext ofintertemporaldecision-making. The
basicimplications of the model, however, are expected to hold under more gen-
eral conditions. These implications cicern the interdeperidencies between
consumption and saving activities, on the one hand, and the allocation of in-
d.ividual working time between conventional work and productive saving on the
other.5
Theplanofthe paper is as follows. A life cyclemodel of con-
sumptionand productive saving without borrowing is developed in Section 1.
Borrowing is introduced into the model anditsrelationship to productive
saving is explored in Section II. In Section III we attemptto elucidate the
model's implications concerning capital accumulation paths andlife cycle varia-
tions in resource allocations to productive activities. Implicationsregarding
the determinants of the propensity to save arederivedin Section IV and then
briefly examined in light of some earlier theoreticaland empirical findings.
I. A Life Cycle Model of Consumption,
Work, and Productive Savin&
To introduce systematically the novel implications of the productive-
saving hypothesis, we consider a simple model of theallocation of time and
goods over the life cycle in which time can be used in onlytwo income generat-
ing activities: conventional work and capital management, orsaving. We as-
sume that the consumption unit's horizon consistsof n equal t!periodsl? over
which it wishes to allocate its productive and consumptive resources so asto
maximize the utility of the overall consumption plan:
U=u(x,1,x2, ...,X,K1.) . (1.1)
Inequation (1.1), X.represents the expected stock value ofa nondtrable
composite marketgood.consumed in period t K is the terminalstockof
physicallynond.epreciable nonhuman capital assets (measured in units of
x) that are bequeathed or carried over beyondtheplanning horizon, and U
is a function that converts stocks of dated goods and terminal wealthinto
consumption flows and utility. The consumption unit is assumedto have a
neutral attitude toward risk. Consequently, it is assumed to behave as if
all the expected variables pertinent to the production and consumption plans are6
knownwithcertainty. For methodological simplicity, it is also assumed that
the price of X is constant at unitythroughoutthe planning horizon and that
no direct costs are entailed in transforming X into K.
The basic constraints limiting the consumption unit's total consumption
andbequestopportunities generally canbeidentified with its initial endow-
mentsof human and nonhuman capital, H0 and K0, and the total amount of
time it can devote to the generation of wage and nonwage income in any period
duringthe life cycle. We assume that productive pursuits are exhaustedby
work and saving. Therefore, abstracting from any effects of "aging" on pro-
ductive capabilities (any depreciation of human resources), human capital is
fixed at its endowed level H0. Assuming that the rental value of one unit of
time spent at work is a single-valued function of the stock of human capital,




0 (H0) is a constant real wage rate defined interms of the composite where ww
goodX, and denotes the amount of time expended in wage-generating
activities (work).
xpectednonwage income can be written as the product of the accumulated
stock of nonhuman capital in the beginning ofa given period Kt_i and the ex-
pected one-period gross rate of return: the expectedinterest, dividends,
royaltje other rental income, and capital gains or losses yieldedper unit of
capital, net of the direct costs of purchased inputs including brokers?fees
and other transaction costs but inclusive of thevalue added through own
efforts. That is,
Rt(ht,H0, Kt1)
=Kt1r(ht, H0) , (1.3)7
where ht is time spent at saving in period t, with r?(h) >0 and
rt(110) > 0. Oui basic thesis is that the expected gross rate of return to
capital, rt, or the expected private lending rate of interest, is not a fixed
yield but rather a continuously increasing and twice differentiable function of
saving time, h,' and the consumption unitts stock of human capital--at least
that part of its human capital that is complementary to the management of
assets.
The production function of nonwage incnme specified in equation (1.3)
shows expected nonwage income to be strictly proportional to Kti at any
given level of ht. While this assumption may be largely valid with regard to
the markets for securities on the grounds that individual portfolios are not
large enough to affect the market prices of securities in their possessioti, it
may not always hold in connection with the management of, say, mortgage assets
and rentals of property. An increase in the amount of capital invested in
these latter assets may require more search and own-supplied management efforts
in order to maintain a given gross rate of return even though diminishing
returnb to managerial efforts may be suppressed to some extent through adjust-
ments in the amounts of hired factors of production. Moreover, retaining such
factors at relatively low levels of portfolio size may be uneconomical. More
generally, then, the expected rate of returns may be written as r(ht, H0, Kti)
with r'(Kti)0. We assume, however, that capital and saving time are com-
plements in the production of nonwage income (see n. 9) and that the magnitude
of rt(Kti) at given levels of ht is negligible over a wide range of port-
folio size (see n. 10).
The total amoune of resources available to a consumption unit for con-
sumption and nonhuman capital holding in any given period is generally the sum
of its nonhuman net worth in the begnning of the period and the stock value
of the wage and nonwage income accruing to it during the period. Initially,
the analysis will proceed on the assumption that the consumption unit engages8
inno borrowing. The capital constraint fora given period then canbestated
in terms of the requirement that total
outlays on goods plus the amountof
capitalaccumulated at the end of the period justexhaust the amount of re-
sources available. That is,
Et+Rt+Ktl=xt+Kt, (l.)
or, substituting equations(1.2) and(1.3) in equation (i.li),
÷ K1 Pt(ht) =X+Ktt =i,...,n, (1.5)
where
pt(ht) =1+r(h)
The problem becomes that of
maximizing equation (1.1) subject to the none-
Deriod capital constraints given inequation (1.5), n time constraints,
T0=/t+htt=l, ...,n, (1.6)




Amore illuminating formulation of the problem can be achievedthrough an in-
iuctivesolution of the set of equations (1.5)in terms of the initial endow-
nentof nonhuman capital given inequation(1.7). This is permissible on the
ssumption that no borrowing for consumption purposes is desiedby the con-
3umption unitsothat none of the single period constraints isbinding. Using
?quation (1.6), the resulting overall wealth constraint is1
n n+l n+l
E Iw0
p (T -t) + U t(T0 -t t=l i=t+l t=l
(1.8) n n+l
=E iTP.(T0-t.)+K, t=1 i=t+l ' 19
where p1 n+1
Equation(1.8) is just a variant of the Fisherian wealth constraint: it equates
the total expenditures on goods and bequest evaluated in terms of period n
"dollars" with the similarly evaluated future value of the consumption unit's
wage and nonwage receipts. Unlike the Fisherian model, which assumes identical
market discount rates for all individuals, this model allows the private lending
rates of interest to vary across different consumption units and over time ac-









theset of first-order optimality conditions for internal solutions involving
positive values of all the control variables is given by8
n+l
MU(xt)_XU p.(hj=o t=l,...,n, (1.lOa)
i=t+l
MIJ(K)-x=o, (1.lob)
ni-i t-i t-l ni-i
E (w° -) p. p. [-r'(ht)]









Given an optimal allocation of productive time between work and saving,
the optimal plan of consumption and terminal capital must satisfy the set of








The latter set of equations reproduces the familiar result that the ratios of
the marginal utilities of consumption goods in different time periods must be
the same as the ratios of their respective-marginal costs: the terms at hich
alternatively dated (otherwise identical) consumption claims canbetraded be-
tween any two periods. If borrowing for consumption is undesired, these terms
of trade are determined by tllendingfl or productive saving opportunities.
Equation (1.lla) shows that the optimal level of terminal capital (measured in
terms of the composite good x)mustyield the same marginal utility as con-
sumption in the final period of the planning horizon since this capital canbe
exchanged with similarly dated consumption claims at equal marginal costs.
In turn, given an optimal consumption-bequest plan, an optimal alloca-
tion of productive time between work and saving in any given period must satisfy
the set of equations summarized in (l.loc). Dividing this equation through by
n+l
the price of consumption in period t, fl p., and noting that by definition
i=rt-i-l
(seen. 7), kl(tkw° -Xk) +
K0 =Kt1, the necessary con-
dition for optimal participation in work and saving involving positive values
of and ht can be rewritten as
= Kti rt(ht) t = 1, ...,n. (1.12)U
Equation (1.12) is the familiar factor employment equation of general price
theory. It states that an optimal allocation of time between work and saving
at any given period in which there is positive participation in each activity
can be achieved only if the marginal return to time is identical in both. The
sufficient condition that such an allocation of productive time will maximize
the total expected return from employment (given the level of initial capital
and the constancy of the wage rate) is that there be diminishing marginal pro-
ductivity of saving time, or r"(h) < 0. Figiire 1 illustrates these conditions
graphically. With the assumption that saving time and noiihuman capital are
complements in the generation of nonwage income and given a constant opportu-
nity cost of time, an immediate implication is that the optimal extent of self-
employment in saving activities, except in cases of specialization in work or
saving activitie would be an increasing function of the initial amount of ac-
cumulated capital that summarizes the results of earlier productive and con-
sumptive resource allocations (see Figure 2). A fortiori, given w and K,
any decrease in the marginal productivity of management time due to exogenous
factors operating in capital markets would increase individuals' demand for
conventional market activities relative to time in productive saving.
These results may be modified to some degree if markets for capital
provided opportunities for substitution between own management of portfolios
and the services of hired specialists. However, we expect these opportunities
to be imperfect in practice. In the first place, inasmuch as specialists
differ in abilities and the information they possess regarding various assets
at different points in time, investors would have an incentive to search for
productive managers. In addition, transaction costs incurred in hiring special-
ists' services may make their retention uneconomical especially when the port-




















Moreover, a complete reliance on specialists generally would be optimal only
if specialists' services could be considered as perfect substitutes to own
productive saving in all relevant aspects of saving. But specialists need not
have the same incentive for prudence in the management of owners' assets as
have the owners themselves. Thus both factors of production may be used in
managing individual portfolios in accordance with cost minimizing principles.
As long as own entrepreneurial services and specialists' services were com-
plementary in the production of nonwage returns, the employment of both may be
expected to rise as individual portfolio sizes rise. Formally, the analysis
of optimal employment of hired factors of production is similar to the analysis
ofborrowing for productive saving that isconsidered in the following section.
Bothareundertakenso as to maximize wealth. Since services rendei'ed by hired
factors areexpectedto raise the lending rate of interest at any given level
of ownsavingactivity, their optimal employment is expected to increase mono-
tonically with portfolio size even when the consumption unitspecializesin
productive saving, i.e., when ht/To =1.
The interaction between productive and consumptive allocations of re-
sources and the stability conditions underlying these allocations can be il-
lustrated graphically by means of conventional, two-period analysis, Let the
consumption unit's horizon consist of two periods and let the desired bequest
be zero. The endowment position represented by point C in Figure 3 represents
the amounts of resources available for consumption in periods 1 and 2 in the
absence of any intertemporal capital transfers. These are I and 12 =w°T0,







where the difference I -
K1denotes the amountof capital accumulated
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which duplicates the equilibrium condition for intertemporal allocation of
consumption given in equation (1.11). The important implication of this re-
sult is that the relevant rate of interest affecting intertemporal consumption
decisions is Marshall's gross interest. It is not the net yield. One plus
0
w ht




straight line connecting points P and C in Figure 3,orthe average terms
of trtde between consumption in consecutive periods. What are relevant for
consumption and savings decisions, however, are the marginal terms of trade
that are determined by the (expected) gross rate of return inclusive of the
value added through the investor's own efforts. Since, in general, thegross
rate of return is expected to be positively related to the amount of capital
accumulated, the transformation curve AC in Figure 3 is expected to be convex
toward the origin (see n. 10). The sufficient condition for a stable equilib-
riuin involving productive saving therefore requires that the marginal rate of
substitution in consumption between X2 andX1 rise faster than the cor-
responding marginal rate of substitution in production as more ofX1 is ex-
changed for X2 through productive saving. The shape of the segment of the
consumption transformation curve that involves borrowing for consumption will
be discussed in Section II below.
The behavioral content of the model can be sharpened at theexpense of
some simplifying assumptions oancerning the form of the utility function. Let1Ii
U in equation (1.1) be a homothetic function. For illustration, we choose a
specific form of a hoinothetic function such that
MIJ(x) /x\1/0t
MIT(v- =a+1 ..) ,t = 2,...,n, (1.15)
\t/
where denotes a constant elasticity of substitution between
and i-i,whichis to be defined by the identity T1-a, isan






where denotes the elasticity of substitution between and X, and
to be defined by the identityT 1 -c,is an index of the con-
sumption unit's preference bias in period n toward own consumption relative
to its retirement fund or bequest. By introducing equations (1.15) and (1.15a)
into equations (1.11) and (1.lla), it now can be shown that the optimal rate
of growth of the composite good X over the life cycle and the corresponding
optimal level of bequest relative to consumption 111 the last period of the planning
horizon would be given by
x




The homotheticity of the utility function for lifetime consumption and
bequest generally implies that an increase in the gross rate of interest would
raise the optimal ratio of later to earlier consumption claims in consecutive
periods. More specifically, given the weakly separable C.E.S. utility function
considered in the preceding illustration, the direction as well as the extent15
of the growth of consumption over time are shown by equations (1.16) and (i.i6a)
to be dependent essentially on the difference between the consumption unit's
gross lending rate of interest and its time preference for "present" or own
consumption relative to "future" consumption or bequest. Ihus, if the
consumption unit had neutral time preferences in all periods and the lending
rate of interest wee always positive, then consumption of goods would increase
continuously over the planning horizon and peak at the final period. Moreover,
since by assumption the lending rate of interest is positively related to the
level of saving activity, so would be the optimal rate of growth of consumption
over time, and thus, indirectly, the absolute size of bequest also would re-
late positively to saving activity.
The preceding analysis generally indicates the existence of interde-
pendencies between consumption-saving decisions and work-saving decisions.
Under given labor market opportunitie participation in saving activity is seen
to be inoriotonicafly related to the amount of accwnulated capital. In turn,
the extent of participation in saving activities and the resulting rates of
returnoncapital would, along with time preferences, determine the rate of
growthof consumption over time and,consequently,the rate and direction of
capital accumulation that are necessary to effect the desired consumption plan.
The analysis indicates that then saving activity isviewedas a productive
process,consumption decisions concerning the intertemporal allocations of goods
cannot be separated frctn production decisions concerning the maximization of
wealth and that the separation theorem of conventional models of intertemporal
consumption and production decisions, asserting the independence of the two,
cannot be considered valid.13 Another apparent implication of this analysis,
which is more fully developed in Section IV below, is that different consumption
units--evenequally wealthy ones- -may have different consumption paths not
necessarily because of differences in subjective discount rates or because of16
•systematicassociation between time preferences for consumption and. wealth,
)ut because of differences in their gross rates of retuni to savings due to
Iif±'erences in their initial endowments of nonhumanandhuman capital and
bilities.
:i. Foductive Saving andBorrowing
For the sake of a simple yet general introduction of borrowing opportu-
iities into ourchoicetheoretic framework, we make the following assumptions
oncerning the marketforborrowing. We assume that borrowing, like consump-
'ion and the augmentation of capital assets, occurs at the end of a standard
eriod and that principal andinterestpayments mature andareplanned to be
aid at the end of the succeeding period. The length of a standard borrowing
eriod is identified with the length of a single period of the consumption
• • . nit'splanning horizon. We further assume that the marginal borrowing cost
f capital is a function of the amount borrowed, D,andtheborrower's net
orth,N. That is, in symbols, MbC=MbC(Dti,Ntj),with MbCI(Dti)>0
udCt(Nti) <0. Thelogic behind the productive saving hTothesis
uggests that borrowing costs also should be influenced by resource expendi-
ures by the borrower in search for less expensive sources of funds. We shall
iscuss this possibility later in this section. Initially, borrowing is viewed
s an activity that does not ccnsume resources.
A consumption unit can borrow for two fundamentally distinct purposes.
ne is to finance current consumption of nondurable goods./ The other is to
ugnient the amount of income generating assets under its command. We call the
econd borrowing for productive saving. Clearly, borrowing for productive
aving is inconsistent with the simple Fisherian model of saving which assumes
aat the lending and borrowing interest rates are identical. It also is in-
Dnsistent with differing, though constant, lending and borrowing rates since then17
the latter must always exceed the former. Under the assumptions of rising
marginal borrowing costs, however, such borrowing is compatible with productive
saving activities since the expected gross rate of return on assets is assumed
to be an increasing function of saving activity.
Regardless of whether productive saving is ownfinancedor fundedby
borrowing,borrowing for consumption is not expected to be undertakensimul-
taneously with productive saving activity. It would not pay the consumption
unit to borrow funds to finance consumption purchases prior to tapping its own
capital assets because the cost of borrowing funds at the margin necessarily
exceeds the return from lending foregone if own, rather than (additionally)
borrowed, capital is used. This is readily seen when borrowing for productive
saving is optimal. Then the marginal gross return on own capital must fall
short of the minimum cost of borrowing funds. Moreover, if the consumption
unit has already undertaken positive borrowings for productive saving, then
borrowing additional funds for consumption cannot be optimal since, as will be
shown later, optimal borrowing for productive saving requires equality in
equilibrium between the marginal borrowing cost of capital and the gross rate
of return on that capital." Thus, we derive the important implication that
any borrowing can be considered borrowing for productive saving as long as
the consumption unit has positive holdings of nonwage income generating capital
assets(excluding emergency funds thatmay besubsumed underconsumption expendi-
tures).The foflowingaxalysisindicates that the relevant rate of interest
or interteniporal consumption decisions then would be identified with the 'oss
(lending) rate of interest on own capital.
The preceding discussion suggests that when borrowing opportunities
areavailableto the consumption unit,theresource constraint limiting cal-
sumption and capital holding in each period canbespecified in either of two18
forms depending upon whether borrowing is done for thepurpose of consumption
or for productive saving. In the first case, the one-periodresource caistraint
is given by
w°t+DtXt+tDti, (2.1)
where 1 + indicatesthe average return to the lending institution,
=T,and Dt may be positive, negative, or nhl The terms of trade between
pairs of consumption goods in different periods would be determinedby the
marginal borrowing cost of capital, which is expected to rise with the scale
of borrowings. Thus, the relevant transformationcurve between futureand
presentconsumption would be concave toward the origin, as depicted by the arc
CB in Figure 3. In the case of borrowing for productivesaving, the one-
period resource constraint is given by
+Nt_it ÷ Dt_i (- =+ N, (2.2)
ihere Dt_i .
(p.c
-ö)Dt_i (rt -bt)represents the net income generated
bhrough productive borrowing. By utilizing the equilibrium conditions foroptimal
orrowing and saving activity, it can easily be shown that the slope of the
ransformatjon curve between futureandpresent consumption then woi.ld be
Lictated by the lendingrateof interest as is the arcACin Figure 3.In
rincipie, one cannot rule out the possibility that the consumption unitwould
ea net borrower in some periods and d.net1ender in other periods. By
'urther restriction of the utility function of lifetimeconsumption and. be-
uest considered in Section I, however, one can show that erraticswitching
rorn a position of i. net borrower to one of a net lender is not likely to
ccui from one period to another. Lettheparameter in equation (1.15)
a constant throughoutthe relevant planning horizonandlet the parametersof
guation(l.15a) dictate any positive ratioof terminai capital toconsumption
different periods. Clearly,then, as long as there were noexogenous in-19
creases in wage income over time, borrowings for consumption purposeswould be
inconsistent with a positive difference between objective (lending orborrowing)
interest rates andsubjectiverates of time preference. The reason
is that equation (i.i6) then would imply a strictly isingconsumptionpath
overtime, whereas the borrowing of capital for current. consumptiondecreases
the amount of resources that canbeexpended on bequestor the purchase of goods
in at least one future period by the amount of debt service payments.This
assertion must be modified, of course, if wage income grew over timeat a rate
exceeding the optimal rate of growth of planned consumption expenditures.In
our deterministic model of intertemporal consumptionand production decisions,
however, the growth of wage income must be explained primarily asthe result
of human capital accumulation. Intensive investment in human capitalis ex-
pected to take place early in the investor's life, duringwhich time he might
also resort to net borrowing of capital if his initial net worth is negligible.
But with rt > Tt, and with accumulation of human capital rapidly leveling off,
as models of human capital accumulation invariably predict (see,in particular,
Becker (l96i.) and Mincer (i971.)), the only way to effect a plan of persistently
rising consumption expenditures is by gradually building up,and then maintain-
ing, a positive stock of own physical capital. Sincethe main interest in this
paper is in explaining the behavior of consumptionunits with positive levels
of capital assets, we henceforth focus on the implications of borrowingfor
productive purposes, assuming that r(ht) > Tt and that asset holdings are
nonnegative throughout the relevant planning horizon, starting at t =1.
With this restriction in mind, it is easily shown that the overall
wealth constraint for consumption units that are net lenders throughout their
planning horizon would be20
.
0 + -5t+iDt=t+2+ N0 l
(2.3) n n+l
=Ex TIP+N t=1 i=t+]
where N0 and NnK1. denote, respectively, the consumption unit's own ini-
tial and terminalphysicalcapital. bptimai consumption and production deci-
sions now can be derived by differentiating the utility function of lifetime
consumption andbequestwith respect to the relevant choice variables, subject
to the wealth constraint given in equation (2.3). The optimality conditions
for consumption decisions .are formally the same as those derived u-i Section I.
Production decisions, however, involve the simultaneous determination of optimal
values of f(orht) and Dti. Given the value of Dti, the optimal
allocation of time between work and saving must satisfy the set of optimality
conditions
w° =(Nt_i+ Dt1) r'(ht) (2.)
(Nt_i + Dti) r"(ht) < 0 , (2,a)
provided that ht and are positive; t =1,...,n.These conditions are
formally identical to the conditions for optimal work and saving decisions de-
rived in Seclion I except that hereKt is comprised of both own and borrowed
assets. In turn, the optimal scale of borrowing in any period where D > 0
must satisfy the set of equations
r(ht) =b(Dti,Nt )(1 + MbC (2.5)
__ .
vrbCt/Dti_bt(Dti)(l + -
b(Dti,Nt1) >0 , (2.5a)21
D
where bD =D
• .Theexpression on the left-hand side of equation
t-1t
(2.5) isthe marginal rate of return on lending andtheexpression on the right
isthe marginal borrowing cost of capital. In equilibrium, of course, they
mustbe thesame. The sufficient conditions for optimalvaluesof
Dtito maximizetheconsumption unit's wealth, in addition to (2.li-a) and
(2.5a),require that
+Nti)rt1(ht) Ct/Dtj -[rt(ht)]2
> 0 . (2.6)
Diagrammatically,equation (2.6) is satisfied if the marginal borrowing cost
ofcapitalbecomes increasingly adverse to the borrower, relative to his rate
ofreturn on nonhuman capital, as he expands the scale of his borrowing.19
These optimality conditions are portrayed in Figure II.
Thecentral behavioral implications of the foregoing analysis involve
potential interdependencies between N and D. At low levels of net worth,
saving activity may be negligible, and so r(h) is expected to be lower than
the marginal borrowing cost of capital. Little borrowing for the purpose of
acquiring additional income generating assets is expected. But as N grows
and participation in saving activity is enhanced, r(h) also is expected to
rise sufficiently to make borrowing for productive saving optimal. Moreover,
an increase in own assets is expected to promote a greater absolute amount of
borrowing as well as greater participation in productive saving activity.20
This is demonstrated graphically in Figure II., where an increase in N from
N0 to N1 is associated with a greater absolute increase in K from K0 to
K1. This analysis does not rule out borrowing for productive saving at low
levels of asset holdings. It implies, however, that such borrowing is more
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sets since their lending rates of interest are expected to be relatively large
at given levels of asset holdings. Thus we expect that borrowing for productive
saving will be more prevalent among unincorporated business families than among
families of wage earners. Indeed, at low levels of asset holdings entrepre-
neurial savings consequently may be more negative than those of wage earners.
The analysis generally implies that saving activity and productive borrowing
can be considered "complements" in the sense that an increase in one activity
due to exogenous factors will promote both.
The analysis so far has ignored the possible role of ti!ne and
other resources in borrowing costs. In the generally segmented market for bor-
rowing, careful search among lenders may reduce the borrowing costs of capital
to the consumption unit at any level of borrowing and net worth. Optimal bor-
rowing activity would then be achieved when the marginal return from time de-
voted to shopping for funds, a, is equa] to the opportunity cost of time in
other pursuits. The necessary condition for an optimal allocation of time be-
tween work, borrowing, and saving activities, if all are positive, is given by
w0 =(Nt_i+Dt_i)r'(ht) =_Dt1b'(at) , (2.7)
where b(at) is a continuously decreasing, twice differentiable, and convex
function of at.
Productive borrowing and saving activities generally are expected to
be complementary in affecting nonwage returns. Indeed, these may be joint
activities from the investor's point of view. In general, active borrowing
for productive saving is likely to take place at a relatively high level of
borrowing which, in turn, is expected to increase with net worth. Moreover,
the higher is N at any given level of opportunities for work, the greater
will be the amount of time devoted to both saving and borrowing. Thus, the23
formal incorporation of productive borrowingactivity in the model strengthens
theimplications of the preceding analysis of productiiresaving. The main signi-
ficance is in pointing to the potential existence ofan additional source of
productivityin the process ofgenerating nonwage income.
III.Capital Accumulation Paths and Life
Cycle Variations in Productive
ResourceAllocations
Whiletheallocation of goods over time, the allocation of time between
work and saving,andthe optimal level of productive borrowing in eachperiod
are the"control variables" of ourmodel,the accumulation of nonhumancapital
over the planning horizon is the "state variable" thatsummarizes all previous
production and consumption decisions. Since changes in thelevel of accumulated
capital, in turn, indicate the magnitude of savings in eachperiod, optimal
savings paths can be derived through analysis ofcapital accumulation paths.
As in Section II, the analysis here will focuson consumption units with posi-
tive capital assets. For methodologicalconvenience, we assume that on the
average life cycle expectations are fulfilled so that theplanned resource al-
locations of a representative consumption unitare realized in practice.
The one-period resource constraint givenby equation (1.5) can alter-
natively be defined by
=w°+K1r -(Nt
-N1) t =1,...,n >0. (3.1)
tithout loss of generality, we now ignore the separate role ofproductive
)orrowingandidentifyKt with Nt. Wealso assume that r(ht''-l
=
Efhuman capital andthewage rate from work are constant, the change in the






The term Nt =Nt÷i
-
Nt
represents the magnitude of savings in period t.
Since an optimal allocation of time between workand saving insures the equal-
ity of the marginal returns on all productive usesof time, the first term on
the right-hand side of equation (3.2) in equilibrium is equalto zero (provided
that specialization in saving activities implies that htis constant), and





Equation (3.3) defines a direct relation betweenthe rate of change in the
allocation of goods and the rate of capital formation over time.For example,
if the gross lending rate of interest exceeds the subjectiverate of time pref-
erence in all the relevant periods, as was assumed inthe preceding section,
then the optimal path of the allocation of goods will be risingthroughout the
planning horizon, or X. > 0 in all t. If, in addition, relative prefer-
ences between om consumption and bequest in the final periodof the planning
x(N* l
horizon are such that the optimal ratio N* implies N > N1, then
and hence the algebraic value of savings in period t,must have been
positive in all preceding periods. Alternatively,if the consumption unit is
initially a net borrower, then its debt must bereduced in part or in full fol-
lowing the initial period(s) of borrowing when networth is either zero or
negative. To prove this, note that if Nt1 were negative,then Nt neces-
sarily has the same algebraic sign to insure that X. > 0, since byrearranging
terms, equation (3.3) can be written as
=[l+r(ht+i)]--t=1,•..,n-l . (3.)25
The path of capital accumulation would be falling continuously over timeonce
the consumption unit starts dissaving. But such a path would be inconsistent
with N1 =
Nn
- >0. The optimal path of capital accumulation must
then be continuously rising over time. Possibly, however, relativepreferences
between on consumption and bequest in the typical case are such that the ratio
N implies .1V* < N1 (see the discussion in n. 12). IfNn > N in
this case, the optimal path of capital accumulation must rise initiallyover
some range of the planning horizon, attain a peak, and then continuously de-
cline over the final range (see Figure 5).Thispath of capital accumulation,
of course, may be consistent with < N0 also. The main implications of
this analysis can be summarized by the following theorem.
Theorem: Given a homothetic utility function of lifetime consumption as con-
sidered in Section I, with the gross rate of interest always exceeding the rate
of time preference, and with a constant wage rate, the capital accumulationpath
is either continuously rising (with a possible net indebtedness being first
settled) or is initially rising and then falling, provided that initial capital
ioes not exceed terminal capital.
The preceding analysis depends crucially on the assumption that thewage
rate w° =w(H0)is constant throughout the planning horizon. If it were sub-
ject to uncontrollable variations over the life cycle, equation (3.Ii) would
reflect such variations as follows:
- = [1+r(ht)]k1- (3.5)
learly,then, any systematic exogenous decreases in the wage rate would
trengthen the above theorem, whereas systematicexogenous increases in the
rage rate may render it invalid, unless the difference - werealways
ositive. Under the deterministic model of productivesaving, however, changesFigure 7








t26 . inthe wage rate over time areexpectedto occur mainlyasa result of positive
investments in human capital, so far assumed to be endowed at a constant level.
Investment in human capital is clearly an alternative means of accumulating
capital assets or engaging in productive saving. AM, as has already been
pointed out in our analysis in Section II, the accumulation of human capital,
due to its embodiment in the investor and. its nonmarketability in general, is
expectedto takeplace early in thelife cycle. Following the termination of
investments inhumancapital, w =w(H)is expected to remain constant or de-
clineas a result of depreciation of human capital. The theorem expounded in
the preceding discussion would then hold unambiguously. But even during the
period of accumulation of human capital, the theorem may remain valid if human
and nonhuman capital were complements in the production of wealth, because
planned persistent increases in consumption expenditures, in the absence of
expectations for purely exogenous increases in wage income, must be effected
through some positive accumulation of future income-generating assets--human
or nonhuman--as long as initial (nonhuman) capital is less than or equal to
terminal capital (N0 <N). Indeed., human and nonhuman capital assets are likely
to be acquired simultaneously, at least throughout the latter part of the human
capital investment period, if only because an increase in human capital may en-
hance productivity in saving activities.'
The paths of capital accumulation derived above generally appear com-
patible with empirical evidence relating to asset holdings in a cross section
of age groups at a point in time (see, e.g., Projector and Weiss (1966), Tables
A8 and AlO). These paths might also be used to predict life cycle variations in
hours ofwork andlabor forceparticipation rates. If wage rates andthe
marginalproductivity of savingtimewere constant over the planninghorizon,27
the amount of working time devoted to labor market activities would tend to
decline as caiiital was continually accuilated and the amount of time devoted
to self-employment in the management of capital assets would adually increase,
peaking at the peak of nonhuman asset accunmiation. The latter result follows
from equation (1.12) since, with a constant market price of time and an un-
changing function r(h, k), there exists a unique relationship between the size
of capital accumulated and the expected absolute amount of time devoted to saving.
This prediction remains valid even if human capital changed. systematically over
the life cycle, provided that it had a neutral effect on the productivity of
time devoted to saving and to work, as well as to other potential pursuits.
Specifically, if =t-land rt =r(ht
.Hti),
an increase in
would. not affect the equilibrium condition for an optimal allocation of time
between work and saving since the ratio wt/rt(ht) would be invariant to
changes in Hti. It is possible, of course, that human capital acquired
through general schooling and training is biased in favor of conventional labor
market activities. Persons with such training would tend to specialize in labor
market activities at least through the period of intensive training and. other
related investments. Still, our basic prediction concerning the effect of
physical capital accumulation on the allocation of time between work
andsavingis expected to hold at any given level of human capital accumula-
And it is expected to hold even more strongly during the period of
net human capital depreciation as long as there was no comparable deaccumula-
tion of nonhumancapital.Indeed, empirical evidence controlling for family
income indicates that the share of nonhumanassetsamong all assets increases
continuously with age: controlling for family income, Projector and Weiss
(op. cit., pp. 7,8) reporta positive correlation between net asset holdings
and.ageacross. the entire age range. A general implications of the analysis is28
thatas age rises the fraction of all working time devoted to asset management
also rises. Evidence derived from the same data analyzed by Projector and Weiss
is consistent with this implication. It shows thatamong all household heads
the proportion of those who are self-employed increases monotonically withage.
Even retirement may be explained, in part, as a consequence of nonhuman capital
accumulation inducing specialization in saving activities. If, however, asset
holdings substantially decrease later in life, then the allocation of working time
between saving and work may once again shift in favor of the latter. Reentry
into the labor market after a period of specialization in self-employment might
beexplained as a consequence of deaccumulation of assets which decreases the
marginal productivity of saving time relative to labor market ea1ning power.
IV. The Average Propensity to Save
In the preceding section we discussed expected capital accumulation
pathsover the life cycle, Of course, realized paths may vary among consuiixp-
tion units of like characteristics, Consumption units also differ in their
initialendowments of humanandnonhumanassets and. in their chosen occupational
careers.In this section we discuss the effects of these differences on the
propensity to save in light of the productive saving hypothesis,
Consider, first, the effect of anincrease in wealth due to an
exogenousincrease in the endowment of nonhuman capital or the corresponding
magnitudeofnonwage income.In the Fisherian model this would not affect
the relativeinterteniporal allocation of goods if the utility function of life-
time consumption and. bequest were homothetic. This implication of the Fisherian
modelunderlies the well-known theories of the consumption function by Friedman
(1957)andby Modigliani and Brumberg (1951i-). Interms of the permanent income
hypothesis one can write
X =kt(r) (.1)29
where denotes permanent income (or wealth) as evaluatedby the consunrption
unit at age t,andktmeasures its average propensity to consume out of
permanent income. If r were constant, so wouldbek. In constrast, our
model suggests that an exogenous increase in net worth ornonwage income would
increase simultaneously the desired amount of assetholdings, the optimal
amount of productive resources allocated to saving activity (includingom time,
hired factors, and borrowing activity), and the rate of returnon savings.
Consequently, we expect an exogenous increase in net orth to decrease the
average propensity to consume out of permanent income. This major implicatLon
of the analysis can be demonstrated, graphically via thetwo-period consumption
model discussed in Section I. An increase inK0 (as in Section I, we here
identify K with N) implies that he initial endowment point Bin Figure 6
shifts out horizontally to point F. Since theconsumption unit's wage rate
is unaffected, the consumption transformationcurve passing through F, BFB',
is just a horizontal translate of the initialtransformation curve, AEA'./
Clearly, the slope of the curve BFB' is steeper than theslope of AEA'
along the ray OP' passing through the initial equilibriumposition P.
Thus, if the utility function is homothetic the new equilibriumposition must
lie to the left of the ray OP',say at point Q. Both the optimal level
of net worth in period 1 and the optimal ratio increase as a result.
That an increase in the desired level of assetholdings increases the optimal
ratioof futureto current consumption can beverifed mathematically by
differentiatingequation(1.16) with respect toK.1 since
d ao(x2/x)
=22/1>0 ' (1.2)
as long as r'(K1)dr2/dX1 > 0. If desired bequest were nil, an increase
in x2/x1 necessarily implies that thepercentage increase in wealth, defined
at the new equilibrium position Q by =
X1p(h2) +X2,exceeds the









income, k1, then is expected to fall. The same result obtains if the analysis
is generalized to n periods. Furthermore, since by equation (l.16a) the ratio
of bequest to the planned consumption expenditures in period n is independent
ofwealth, planned bequest, ifpositive, would rise by the same 'proportion as
X. Consequently, the ratio of thediscounted, aswell asundiscounted, life
timeconsumption to life time income would necessarily fall." Regardless
of whether bequest is optimal, the decline in the ratio o± current consumption
to wealth as northuman wealth rises also implies that the ratio of current con-
sumption to current income falls. That is, the analysis implies that both
and X/Y decline as wealth rises.'
Next, consider an increase inwealthdue to a greater ?tendowmentt
of humancapital.Since the corresponding increase in earningpowerimplies
anincrease incurrent wage income as well as in potential wage income in all
relevant ftitureperiods, the end.owment position in Figure 6shiftsupward and.
to the right of point E, but below the ray OE'. -'PointH illustrates an
increasein wage income in pexod 1 by an amount equalto the absolute increase
innonwage resources considered in the preceding illustration. If the increase
in humancapitaldoes not affect the consumption unit's rate of return at
given levels of nonhumancapital, that is, if dr(K)/dH=0,thenthe new
consumptiontransformation curve passingthrough H, CaC',againwouldbe
a horizontal translate of curvesAEA.'and. BFB' after adjusting for the
vertical distances between the different endowment positions. It can easily
be shown inthis casethat the new optimal ratio of to would be
higherthan their initial ratio at point P, but lower thanthe corresponding
ratioassociated with an equal increase in nonwageincomeor nonhumanwealth
(comparepoints R and QinFigure 6).Apermanentincreasein wage income
here is found to raise the optimalsavingsto wealth ratio bylessthanwould
an equal once and forall increase in nonwage incomeornonhumanwealth.More-
over, this conclusion is strengthened if the effect of an increasein wage
incomeis compared with the effect of an increase in nonwage income or nonhuman31
wealth that led. to an equalincreasein the consumption unit'soverallwealth.
This easily can be verified by comparing the equilibrium positions Rand. S
associated with the consumption transformation curves CHC'andDGD',
respectively. By construction these twocurvesintersect at point R.
Since, in general, a changeinhuman capitalmay alterthe allocation
ofresources to productive saving activity, the preceding illustration,assumng
no such effects, may serve only as a bencbmark for analysis of moregeneral
cases. A neutral effect of human capitalonthe productivity of resources at
work and saving, as analyzed in Section III, would not affect the allocation
of working time and other resources between the two activities but would.raise
the productivity of time and other resources spent saving atgiven levels of
Kt1. The result could be an increase im r(K), hence in the steepness of
the arc OH along the curve CHC'. The implication of thepreceding analysis
concerning the positive effect of an increase in wage income on the optimal
saving to wealth ratio then would be fortified. In constrast, if human capital
were "biasedt' in favor of conventional labor market activities, which is likely
if it were comprised mainly of "general" schooling and labor marketexperience,
thenanincrease in human capital, byshifting the allocation of resources away
fromproductive saving toward "work," might decrease the levek of r(K), hence
the steepness of the transformation curve OH. Anexogenous increase in wage
earnings due to an improvement in labor market opportunitiesis an obvious
example of a shift inopportunities that may "bias" the allocation of resources
away from productive saving. In these cases the optimal savings to wealth
ratio resulting from an increase iiiwageincome may be decidedly lower than
the one resulting from an equal increase in nonwage income or nonhuman wealth.
This analysis may be used to reinterpret the positive association
between the level of measured income and theaverage propensity to save as
reported in numerous budget studies without exclusive resort to explanations32
&rawingon the effect of variations in transitory componentsof income onthe
propensity to save. Households or spending units of given age,schooling, and
labor marketexperienceand with larger endowmentsofnonhumancapitalmay
have higherpropensities to save out of permanentincomebecause of their
relatively higher rates of returnon savings. A similarconclusionmayalso
apply to the propensities to save of consumption unitso± a given age and net
worth and with higher levelsof human capital,providedthe cha'acter of their
humancapital were not %iased" significantly againstsavingactivities.--'
Inasmuch as cross-sectional variations inincome reflect variations in permanent
components of income, an observation of a systematic associationbetween the
propensity to save and income may be explained,at least inpart, as a con-
sequence o± a positive association between permanentincome and. the productive




with <0. Equation (1,..3) is cctrpatible with Keynes' (second)"law"
pt
of consumption (see Keynes (1961), pp. 28,126). In our analysis thelaw is
conditional, however,uponthe interaction between the optimal level of
accumulated assets and productive saving activity and. does not rely on any
systematic association between time preference for consumptionand wealth.
It also should be noted that our result is statedinterms of anegative associa-
tion betweenpermanent income and the averg, but not the marginal propensity
to consume.
The preceding analysis may be applied ire directly in interpreting
empirical, evidence on the average propensities to consume ofdifferent occupational
and racial groups. Assuming(as does Friedman (1957),pp. 61, 80) that transi-
torycoiuponents of measured income and. consumption expenditures tend to average33
outtozero across all income brackets of specific occupational and racial
groups, the average consumptiontoincome ratios of these groups may serve
asunbiased estimators of their average propensities to consume out of per-
manent income. Indeed, Table 1 contains evidence on average consumption to
average income ratios of independent business, farm, and other spending units
inthe UnitedStates in l9l.8-5Ohichappeai to be highly compatible with the
productivesaving hypothesis. The groups of farmers and.independent business
units canbe distinguished from others in that they presumably are more
"specialized"indirect management of their assets and engage less 5n conventional
t?worktTrelative to other groups. Not only are independent business units and.
farmers expected to allocate more resources into productive saving activities
relativeto those thospecialize in wage earnings, also their specific human
capital--trainingandjobexperience--is likely to be more complementary to
the management of their business assets. Consequently, we would.expectthe
rateof return on their nonhuman capital(especially on equity in own business),
and. hence their averagepropensity to save out of permanent income (especially
in the form of business assets), to be relatively high. Moreover, since independent
business units in the 1914.8-50 sample on the average have more income and pre-
sumablylarger portfolios of capital assets thanfarmers, they are expected to
allocaterelatively more resources, own andhired, into productive saving than
dofarm units (many of which are farm laborers). Consequently, the average
propensityto save of independent nonfamnbusiness units may indeed be expected.
tobe higher than that of farm units."
The well-known permanentincomehypothesis providesan effective
andsystematic explanation forcross-sectional differences between least squares
regression estimates of marginal propensities to consume out of measured income































Note: Figuresare formoney consumption and. money disposable
income.
Source: Friedman (1957, p. 71)3)1
virtue of the different degrees to which variations in the total income of
these groups are accounted for by variations in transitory components of
income. However, it does not appear to offer similarly powerfulexplanations
of systematic differences in the average consumption to income ratios of
these groups. The main consideration raised by Friedman in connection with
the evidence reported in Table 1 is that the relatively larger variance in
transitory income obtained by business and farm units makes it optimal for
them to save more than nonfarm, nonbusiness units for thepurpose of building
up reserves for emergencies. By similar reasoning, however, the average pro-
pensitytosave out of permanent incoae is also expected to be negatively re-
lated to the ratio of nonhuman capital to permanent income, as the discussion
in n. 25 indicates. Since the income of business and farm families derives to
a large extent from their nonhuman capitsi assets, the ratio of their nonhuman
assets to their permanent incomes should be markedly higher than that of other
families as an occupational prerequisite. Indeed, evidence based on theSurvey
of Financial Characteristics of Cnsumers in 1963 shows that the ratio of mean
nonhuman wealth (including business assets) to mean income of self-employed units
jabout7 as compared to 2 for salaried units. Even when business assets are
excluded, the nonhuman capital to income ratio of the self-employed is about 1j,
ascompared to 1.8 for the salaried. (See Projector and Weiss (1966), Tables A8
and A3)-i-.)The higher ratio of' nonhuman assets to permanent income of' business
fainilies might lessen the incentive in these groups to save for emergencies.
The productive saving hypothesis thus offers an independent and consistent in-
terpretation for differences in the average propensities to consume of these
different occupational groupings (also see Friedman (1957),pp. 69, 78).
A second application of this analysis concerns the apparently
different average propensities to consume of black and. white families as
reported in Friedman (1957, Table 7). In each of ten comparisons of average
propensities to consume of black and white families in various city sizes in35
Northernand Southern states, the ratio is higher for blacks than for their
white neighbors. Reference to systematic differences in the relative disper-
sion of transitory components of measured income across the two groups fails
to provide a consistent explanation for the evidence just mentioned: the rela-
tive dispersion of transitory components of incon of black families is estimated
to be higher than or equal to that of white families in three of the four Southn
communities included in the sample. Yet the average propensity to consume of
black families still appears higher thanthat of whites for all income classes.
On the productive saving hypothesis the relatively lower propensity to save of
black families can be consistently interpreted as a consequence of objective op-
portunities. Discrimination in real estate markets and in markets for certain
unincorporated businesses may limit the range of investment options available to
blacks just as labor market discrimination reduces their wage income opportunities.
Even if discrimination in ]abor markets affected earning opportunities more than
discrimination in capital markets, any presence of the latter implies that r(h)
would be lower for blacks than for whites at any given value of h. Moreover,
blacks generally possess smaller endowments of assets andacquire less (specific)
human capital than whites. Thus, the average propensity to save from permanent
income for black fi1ies might be lower than that for whites not because of
unique motivation or diferent time preference, but becaues of inferior oppor-
tunities for producing returns on noithuman assets.
Although the productive saving model developed in this paper can
be applied in explanation of cross-sectional differences in average propensities
to consume,it is not directly applicable in explanation of secular trends in
the aggregate consumption to income ratios over time. The productive saving
hypothesis links cross-sectional differences in average propensities to
consumeto differences among consumptionunits in theirprivate rates of return
on savings.But while the theory identifies the basic factors affecting the
distributionof private rates of returnata point in time,it has no direct36
implicationsfor movements in the level of the distribution over time. The
latter essentially depends on market forces determining the real rates of
interest in the economy. Moreover, trends in the allocation of resources to
productive saving activities depend on the secular growthOflabor-market-
specific human capital relative to other human and nonhuman capital assets
as well as on structural trends in occupational coniposition in the economy.
Thus, the cross-sectional implications of the theory would be consistent
with a virtually zero correlation between permanent income per capita and
theaggregate propensity to consume out of permanent income over time if, as
seems to be the case, the proportion of business and farmfamiliesiii the
economy decreased relative to the proportion of"wage earnersttwhile the average
percapita portfolio sizes increased over the long haul. A comprehensive
analysis of secular trends in the aggregate propensity to consume in light
of this model further requires consideration of secular trends in institutional
and technological factors bearing upon the degree of segmentation or "efficiencytt
of various capital markets and, thus, indirectly on private returns available
from search andrelated asset management efforts.
Conclusion
The thesis developed in this paper is that insofar as opportunities
for gains from saving activities by individuals exist in capital markets, the
rates of return on capitalassets will depend, inpart, on the amount and
efficiency of resources devoted to such activities. Accordingly, private
investment in information concerning the prospects of capital assets and other
related management efforts may be thought of as a special asset commanding a
unique market return. Since opportunities for productive saving activities
depend on the degree of segmentation in capital markets and the magnitude
of relevant transaction costs, the importance of the productive saving hypo-
thesis in explaining saving behavior may vary across different economies or
over time according to the degree of ttimperfectiofltt inherent in capital markets.37
Differencesin rates of return on portfolios of capital assets, or
private lending rates of interest, aretracedexclusively to differences in
resource allocations to productive saving activities since the model is
developed on the simplifyingassumptionthat individual attitudes toward risk
areneutral, in practice, much of the variation in private rates of return
isthe result of differences in thedegree of objective risk associated with
portfolios.The basic implications of the simple model developed here none-
theless are general since they apply to rates of return achieved on capital
assets classified in the same objective ttrisk class. tl A systematic study of
the full nature of the interdependence between productive saving, risk, and
return,aswell as other generalizatiorof the model, are set aside for fu.ture
work.
The set of behavioral implications that are obtained follows
essentiallyfrom the hypothesized interactions between allocations of
resources to saving activities and the level of human and nonhuman capital
assets possessed by consumption units.The main results concern the alloca-
tions of productive and consumptive resources throughout the life cycle and
the interd.ependencies among these allocations. The analysis indicates that
the magnitude of om, hired, and borrowed resources generally is an increasing
function of net worth. It also implies that the paths of human and nonhuman
capital accumulation together determine the allocation of productive resources
between wage and nonwage earnings generating activities. Some of the observed varia-
tion in the extent of participation in conventional "work" over the life cycle
might be explained through considerationof nonhumancapitalaccumulation
paths as derived in Section III. The model generally provides a framework
for analysis of the determinants of self-emplo,ment n the management of
assetsrelative to participation in conventional labor market activities.
Since the magnitude of resources devoted to productive sawing, in
turn, affects the private rates of return on capital assets pertinent to con-
sumptiondecisions, differences amongconsumption units in their allocationsof38
consumptiveresources over the life cycle mayresultlargely from differences
intheir private rates of interest rather than in theirsubjective timepref-
erences or attitudes towardrisk.Perhaps the most intriguing behavioral
implications developed in this paper concern the association between levels
of humanandnonhumanwealthand the average propensityto consume out of
permanentincome, Under certain conditions the analysis can be used to re-
formulate Keynes' postulates concerning a positive association between the
propensity to save and wealth without resort to any systematic associatn
between time preference for consunrption and wealth. The analysis also provides
consistent explanations for evidence reported in the literature concerning
differences in average propensities to consume across occupational and racial
groups without reference to variations in transitory component. of measured
income. Our analysis complements the permanent income hypothesis in one
important sense. whereas the permanent income hypothesis provides a systematic
explanation for differences in statistical estimates of marginal and average
propensities to consume out of measured income, the productive saving hypothesis
provides a framework for analyzingdifferencesin average propensities to com-
sume outofpermanent income across different wealth and occupational groups.
Since our behavioral propositions are based upon systematic variation in
expected rates of return from capital assets inthesame risk class, the em-
pirical ixixplementationof the theory should begin by estimation of nonwage
eariiin genezating functions by relating risk adjusted levels of portfolio
returns to the basic determinants of the allocation of resources to productive
saving.
.Footnotes
1Foran excellent survey of the literature pertaining to the "efficient
markets"hypothesis,see Fama (1970). Althoughthe presentation of the h3rpo-
thesisin the literature is general and may be interpreted as applicable to
allmarkets for capital assets, the illustrationsusually have related to the
marketsfor securities.
2For example, Scholes (1972) has presented evidence indicating that the
total adjustment of a price of a stock to a large secondary distribution of
that stock takes approximately six days. The evidence also indicates that the
sale period itself is too short to account for the entire length of the adjust-
ment period in the market.
3For theoretical and empirical analyses bearing upon the role of educa-
tion in the efficient management of farm assets, see Welch (1970), Shultz (197tl),
and references therein. Differences in efficiency of management of agricultural
enterprises have been recognized in these studies in regard to the speed of
adoption of itmovations and the rapidity of adjustments in resource allocations
to changing market conditions.
Neiderhoffer andOsborne(1966), Lone and Niederhoffer (1968), Scholes
(1969), and Jaffee (1973) present evidence suggesting that officers of corpor-
ations consistently utilize superior information regarding the performance of
stocks. A similar finding concerning specialists in major security exchanges
also is presented in Neiderhoffer and Osborne (1966). Specialists and corpor-
ation officers constitute a small fraction of all investors, but the question
as to whether deviations from the strong form conditon of the efficient markets
model reach further through the investment community has not yet been adequately
explored.5See Marshall (8th edition, l99,pp. 588, 599). Marshall noted in this
context that
"A pawnbroker's business involves next to no risk; but his loans are made
at the rate of 25 percent per annum or more; the greater parbof which is
really earnings of management of a troublesome business. Or to take a
more extreme example, there are men in London, and Paris, and probably
elsewhere, who make a living by lending money to costermongers ... ata
profit of ten percent [per day]: there is little risk in the trade, and.
the money is seldom lost .. .. Butno one can become rich by lending to
costermongers .. .. Theso-called interest on the loans really consists
almost entirely of earnings of a kind of work for which few capital.sts
have a taste."
We are indebted to Lawrence Fisher for pointing out this reference to us.
6Theoverall, expected rate of return on northunian capital generally can
be thought of as consisting of two parts
h rr(O) +rtr' (h) dh 0 < h < ht
where r(O) is the expectedrate of return with no saving activity, and r'(h)
is an additional expected yield achieved through efficient selection and man-
agement activities. It may be noted that the expected rate of return is de-
fined in equation (1.3) as a function of current saving activity only. A more
general formulation of the productive saving hypothesis would relate r to
past periodst allocation of time and otherresources to productive saving as
well. For simplicity, (the effect of) past experience is subsumed under the"en-
dowment" of human capital H0.
7The terminal stock of capital is given by the equation
Kw°+pK -x n n nn-l
where
0 K1 =tnlW+ %-1-2 -
.
10
K1=1w +p1K0 -X1.Substituting the values of K1, ...,K1





where 1. By rearranging terms, the wealth constraint given in equation
(1.8) is easily derived.
8Equation (1.lOa) is derived on the assumption that 't-l =0.For
a simple illustration of the solution when rt is defined as a direct function
of Kt1, see n. 10. The sufficient conditions for values of the control
variables satisfying equations (1.lOa-l.lOd) to maximize equation (1.9) require
that the principal minors of the relevant bordered Hessian matrix of second-
order derivatives alternate in sign.
9The effect of an exogenous increase in Kti on the optimal value of
ht, for ht > 0,can be found by differentiating equation (1.12) with respect

















since by the assumption that ht andKt_i





Sincer't(h) < 0,it is plausible to assume that < 0 provided that
dcl12
r"(h)were either invariant to Kt_i or became more negative asKti in-
creased.Figure 2 portray-s a relationship between ht
Kt_i is
compatible with these assumptions.
10r(h,K1) If were negative, differentiation of equation (1.13) with
t-l
respect to K1 would modify equation (l.l).#-) as follows
-= P(K1)(l+
p2K12i)'
p2K1 '2 K1 r2 where
p2
=r 1 +r2
and MRp2 replaces2 as the gross
marginal return. In this case, if e,.wereconstant and h were
t
positive, then the consumption transformation curve AC depicted in Figure 3




We do not expect the direct negative effect of K on r to dominate its in-
direct effect on r through its positive effect on h except, perhaps, at very
high levels of asset holdings. In that case,
dKti
would be negative in sign
and the transformation curve AC in Figure 3 might be concave toward the origin.
11Specifically,Tt= 0(or 1) implies zero time preference for
X1 relative to X. This form of the utility function and the following
analysis leading to equation (1.16) are entirely based upon that of Becker
(1971,pp.192-193). Fora related analysis, see Modigliani and Bruinberg(1951i-).
l2 alternative formulation ofequations (1.lla), (l.l5a), and (l.16a)
can be achieved by redefining the choice variable K in terms of a "perpetual"
sequence of one-period endowments of the composite good Xthatcan be gener-
atedbythe terminal stock of capital beginning at period n +1andextending
indefinitely:X =dK,where 0 < d < 1 is, say, an "institutional" yieldper unit of bequeathed capital. This approach is an application of the general
treatment of the problem of intertemporal decision-making as a choice between
current consumption and perpetual or permanent future income flows (see
Hirshleifer(197'O), p. 69).Ifthis definition of the choice variable implicit




Equation (l.16b) indicates that X would be smaller than X if the con-
sumption i.mit had neutral (time) preference for own consumption in period n
relative to an annuity of consumption opportunities bequeathed to heirs, since
log d < 0. If wage earnings and saving activity in period n were nil, the
condition X < Xn would also imply that < K1. Savings in the final
period of the planning horizon then would necessarily be negative.
Hirshleifer (1958) showed that the separation theorem implicit in the
assumption of "perfect capital marketst' collapses whenever there is a divergence
between the market's borrowing and lending rates of interest. The preceding
statement can be viewed as a generalization of Hirshleifer's famous result;
the separation theorem collapses even in the case of net lenders, since the
gross lending rates of interest are not constant.
lsince the length of a period in any discrete time analysis is arbitrary,
there is no loss of generality in this assumption. Alternatively, funds bor-
rowed for a duration of more than one period can. be looked upon as two separate
loans taken on successive marketing dates, the latter designated to pay off
the principal and interest on the previously maturing loans.
15The marginal as well as the average borrowing cost of capital can be
expected to rise with the amountborrowedif only because of seentation incapital markets that arises from transaction costs andlegalrestrictions on
certain kinds of borrowing. In addition, the probability ofdefault, as per-
ceived by the lending institution, is likely to rise with theconsumption unit's
debt-equity ratio even if the true risk per dollar of borrowing were constant
or nil (for a discussion of similar arguments in the context of corporate fi-
nance, see Fisher (1959) and Stiglitz (1972)). However, the effect of an in-
crease in Dti. need not be symmetrical to that of a decrease inNt_i. In
the following analysis,"b" denotes the average borrowing rate of interest.
l6rrowingin order to finance the purchase of durablegoods including
own houses does not belong in this category since it isessentially determined
according to whether it is more economical to rent the services yielded by
durable goods or to own them. Thus it is largely independent of timeprefer-
ence for consumptionand canbe considered as special borrowing for productive
saving that does not involve future management costs.
17Let the investor's initial net worthand his initial asset holdings be
given by N1 and K1 in Figure ii. belowand assume that he then finds it op-
timal to increase his current outlays on consumption by LC. He can follow
one of two policies to accomplish that. Policy 1 requires a reduction in his
net worth from N1 to N0, whereN1 -N0N =LC.By the forthcoming
analysis of optimal borrowing for productive saving, the investor's optimal
asset holdings then would fall by an even greater amount from
K1 to K0
(see n. 20). Policy 2 requires additional borrowings in the amount of LC.
That policy thus amounts to a decision to keep intact the initial level of
asset holdings at K1, notwithstanding e decrease in N fromN1 to N0.
Clearly, Policy 1 is superior to Policy 2. In comparison to 1, Policy 2 gen-
erates higher returns but even higher borrowing costs. The net loss associated
with 2 relative to 1 is represented by the triangulararea APB in Figure !..24.5
l8Differentiating the wealth constraint given in equation (3.3) partially




from which equation (2.) is easily derived. This differentiation assumes
that r is not a direct function of K. If it were, the term r(h) in equa-
tion (2.5) would be replaced by MRRt=r(ht,Kti)(l +rk'where
t K1
5rIc =Kti rt
19Equation (3.6) implies that
Ct/Dti > -[r' (h)]2/[ (Nt+Dt1)r"(h)] . (2.6a)
The left-hand side of equation (2.6a) is the slope of the supply curve of bor-
rowedfunds in Figure 3,MbC,and the right-hand side can easily be shown
to be equal to dr(h)/dKti =r'(h) dh/dKti (see n. 9).Thelatter ex-
pressionrepresents the slope ofthe demand curve for productive capital de-
picted by r(h(Kti)) in Figure .Thecurve r must then cut the relevant
MbC curvefrom above as Figure 4 illustrates.
20Theeffect of an exogenous increase in Nti on the optimal values of
Dt_i and t-canbe determined by differentiatingthe first-order optimality
conditionsgiven in equations (2.4) and (2.5) with respect to Nt_i. It is
then seen that if r(ht)/Kt1 =0,then
dD* (Nti+Dt1)r"(ht) +[r'(h)]2 ti—ti >0, t-1
where is defined in equation (2.6). Similarly,16
* Mb,CMbC
d,( _r(ht) D t t-l t-l
dN
= <U, t-l
since r"(ht) < 0 and is assumed negative in sign. The geometrical
proof illustrated in Figureisbased on the following reasoning. If MbC
werejust a function of Dti, then MbC1 would be a horizontal translate of
MbCQ, indicated by the curve CC, with the horizontal distance between the two
being equal to AN =
(N1
-




Moreover, since MbC is assumed to be a decreasing function of N, MbC1 would
lie below the auxiliary curve CC at any level ofKt_i. Clearly, then, the in-
crease in K would exceed the increase in N. It should be noted, however,
that if the marginal rate of return on assets were a decreasing function of the
size of asset holdings (see the discussion in n. 10), then the curve r(Kt1)
in Figure 1, interpreted as indicating the marginal gross rate of return on
capital, would be a domward-sioping curve. It might then be possible for an
exogenous increase in N to lead to a reduction in the amount borrowed for
productive saving. For evidence consistent with the proposition that the in-
dividual portfolio sizes are positively correlated with debt secured by in-
vestment assets, see Projector and Weiss (1966), Table Al4.
21Given the one-period resource constraintas summarized by equation (2.2),
the modified equation of motion (3.3) can be derived by sri analysis similar to




where _Dti b'(Nt1) is, by assumption, positive if > 0. Clearly, the
qualitative implications of equation (3.3a) are the same as those inferred from
(3.3). Note that these implications would not be affected even if it were'4.7
assumed that r(ht,1Vt1)/Nt1 0. In such a case, r(ht+1) in equation









Bya Taylor expansion of r(ht+i) about r(ht) we obtain
2
rt÷1 =r(ht)+r'(ht)t+rtt(ht) +
Assumingthat tht is sufficiently small, 0, the difference
r (ht÷i) -r(ht)can be approximated by r' (ht )h,and the second term on
the right-hand side of equation (4.2), Kti[r(ht÷i) -r(ht)]can be approxi-
mated by _Kt1 r'(ht)A(t .Bycollecting terms, we obtain equation (3.2).
231n addition, as investments in human capital accumulate, they become
more specific and thus more risky to the investor. Relaxing our simplifying
assumption concerning neutral attitudes toward risk, we may conclude that a
risk-averse consumption unit would then seek to diversify its asset holdings
through the building of a positive stock of noithuman assets preceded, perhaps,
by a period of initial dissaving or net borrowing to finance investment in
human capital.
24mpredictionis compatible with evidence reported by Becker concern-
ing the association between the mean number of hours worked in the labor market
by male cohorts of given educational and racial groups, the mean hourly earnings,
and the nonwage family income of the same cohorts. The evidence based on the
1/1000 sample from the 1960Censusshows that an increase in hourly earnings1i8
increases the number of hours worked and that an increase in nonwage family
income reduces it at given average family size and age of the respective male
cohorts(see Ghez and Becker (1972, Ch. Iii). In Becker and GhezTs analysis,
changes in hours of work over the life cycle are expected to be independent of
anticipated changes in nonwage income (or initial net worth') since their model
does not recognize saving activity as an alternative to work and consumption
ac1ivities.
25Friedmanargues, however, that k may increase with the ratio of
nonhuman capital to permanent income K/Yr,becausenonhuman capital, being
more "liquid" and a better collateral against loans than human capital, pro-
vides a superior means of insurance against emergency consumption needs. An
increase in K/Yr thus reduces the need to save for emergency funds at any
given level of permanent income (see Friedman (1957), p. 16). With neutral
attitudes toward risk ouranalysisbelow implies that the absolute level of
nonhuman wealth and possibly even its ratio to permanent income may be posi-
tively related to the propensity to save. Empirical evidence compatible with
this latter prediction thus would indicate the relative importance of thepro-
ductive saving hrpothesis in explaining observed behavior.
26mresultholds even if working and leisure time were not assumed
to be constant in each period but were assumed to vary with wealth. Given
the market price of time, w0, then by equation (1.12) or (2.1.1.) the abso-
lute magnitudes of h and r, hence the slope of the consumption trans-
formation curve, are uniquely related to the level of accumulated net worth
as long as labor market time were positive. Furthennor,insofar as productive
saving involved employment of hired factors, r(K) would generally be in-
variant to changes in wealth. As ourdiscussionin Section I indicates,
.I9
the optimal employment of hired factors, being determined through wealth maxi-
mizing principles, is an increasing function of K and is independent of the
consumptionunit's ealth constraint as well as its wage earnings.
27Utilizingthe preceding two-period analysis and assuming that optimal
bequest is positive, the ratio of the discounted life time consumption to total





andthe ratio of the undiscounted life time consumption to life time income is
given by
x +x x +x x +x
— 12— 1 2 1 2
m1 —+ E+rK1W2 -rX1
—
+ K2+
whereY1 denotes total income receipts, iiicludingthe initial endowments ob-
tained, in period 1. Clearly, anychangein W2 that increases the ratios
x2/x1 and K2/X1 by the same proportion necessarily decreases both m1
and
28i the two period-no-bequest model7 consumption in the second period
equals the total amount of resources available in that period: X2 =K1p(h2)
+E2.
By definition, x2/w2 =[K1p(h2)+E2]/[Y1P(h2) +E2], where is defined
in n. 27. Clearly, X2and are positive linear transformations ofK1
andY1. Thus 1 -
K1/Y1
is a decreasing function of x2/w2. The same
result obtains if bequest is positive, since the ratio K2/X2 is assumed to be
independent of wealth.
9Future income endowments consist of potential wage income only.
Consequently, the endowment position E could shift along rayCE'fol-
lowing an increase in H only if current income endowmentsalso consisted
solely of wage income.50
30
Solmo,n (1971) reported a positive zero-order correlation between
mean savings to income ratios of families classified by schooling attainments
of their heads and the head's educational ranking. However, he has notcon-
trolled for the families' net worth or their age distribution.
31Some evidence insupport of increasing average propensities to con-
sunie out of permanent income is reported by Crocket and Friend (1967).They
have attempted to estimate permanent or "normal" income from-cross-sectional
data containing observations of the samehouseholdformorethanoneyear. A
principal finding of their regression analysis is that the ratio of net worth to nor-
mal income increases with income when the age of the household's head is
heldconstant. They suggest that this finding is inconsistent with saving
theories which contend that permanent savings is a constant fraction of
permanent income.
321tshould be noted that the statistics reported in Table 1 have been
derived by summing data on consumption and income over all imcome andage
brackets sampled in the nationwide surveys of consumer financescovering
191l8, 19119 and 1950 incomes. One interpretation of these statistics is that
they approximate the undiscounted ratios of life time consumption to life time
income of consuniptionunits in different occupationalgroups. Given a stationary
equi1ibrj wIth no bequest, these ratios would be unitaryacross all groups.
However, with optimal bequest being positive, the average undiscounted life
time consumption to life time income would be 1es thanunitary and our theore-
tical analysis would be compatible with the ranking of the statisticsreported
in Table las our discussion in n. 27 indicates.
An alternative interpretation of the ratios reported in Table 1 is that
they approximate, on the average, "current" consumption to inccme ratios of
consumption unitsofage brackets in which savings is positive (say, age l-0;51
an assumption of this kind is made in a similar context in Friedman (1957, p. 92)).
Given this interpretation, our theoretical analysis, again, is compatible with
the ranking of the consumption to income ratios in Table 1, as the discussion in
n. 28 indicates.
Other data concerning the ranking of propensities to saveof dif-
ferent occupational groups alsoare consistent with this analysis. For exam-
ple, Klein (1960) reports relatively higher ratesof saving among entre-
preneurial groups. He also shows that the self-employed save morethan
other families principally because of their business savings. More generally,
Friend and Kravis (1957) show that saving rates of different occupational
groups are closely correlated with the averageincome of these groups.References
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